![]() Impressive images of anti-war protests in Moscow suggest there’s an audience for that content among the Russian public. If Washington wants to push back on Putin’s information campaign in ways that are consistent with democratic values, it could move quickly to detail Russian losses in Ukraine. and divide it from within, while also boosting isolationist sentiment that could drive skepticism of measures that would constrain Russia’s interests. That would be in keeping with Moscow’s long-running effort to distract the U.S. We may also see efforts to amplify emerging partisan splits within the U.S. Generate support among publics for that response.Īs we move into the next phase of this crisis, I expect we’ll see Russia push narratives that deny or deflect blame for its violent misdeeds.Build a common threat picture among partners and allies (including unenthusiastic ones), making it harder for them to plead ignorance or remain on the sidelines and easier for the U.S. ![]() Introduce friction into Putin’s plans and limit his room for maneuver.The primary goal of this effort has not been to prevent Moscow from using force in Ukraine - which was likely impossible - but rather to: Jessica Brandt( Director, Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Initiative and Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technologyįor weeks, Washington and London have been deploying a novel strategy to get ahead of Russian hybrid measures in Ukraine: repeatedly using intelligence disclosures to expose them. Every setback will prompt Putin to raise the stakes yet further. Wars rarely go according to plans, and this one is set to turn bad for Russia because it is based on serious miscalculations about Ukraine’s capacity to defend its statehood, the strength of NATO resolve, and quite possibly the readiness of Russians to partake in this aggression. Now we know that Putin’s obsession with Ukraine - which constitutes a threat to his regime not because of hypothetic NATO missiles, but because of its choice for democracy and closer ties with Europe - prevailed over common political sense and strategic risk assessments. The conflict between progressively autocratic Russia and the West is fundamental and grows deeper with every spike in repressions, but the spasm of this conflict that started last November with the massing of troops and a diplomatic offensive seemed artificially orchestrated and lacking rationale. There was no propaganda campaign in Russia beating patriotic drums for war, which also supported the assumption it was a show of force and posturing. ![]() It is not that the idea of a war between Russia and Ukraine was too hard to contemplate it was rather the assumption that the corrupt regime brings together thieves and rent-seekers, who are not “warriors,” but rather cowards and crooks. Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europeĭespite the strong evidence of Russian preparations for a massive invasion, there was, in my reading, and in the opinion of my many friends in Moscow, a strong possibility to avoid the war and promote the momentum for de-escalation. foreign policy, and much more, and offer policy recommendations for the United States, European, and other governments. ![]() warnings of Russian invasion plans, and was preceded by Moscow’s recognition of two separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine as independent.īelow, Brookings experts analyze the implications of the invasion, for Europe, Russia, international order, U.S. The attack followed months of troop buildups, Russian ultimatums to the United States and NATO, negotiations with the U.S. In the early morning of February 24, Russia launched a full-scale military assault on Ukraine, bombing major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa and invading from Russia, Belarus, Crimea, and the Black Sea. ![]()
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